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I. INTRODUCTION
Mark E. Levonian
I am grateful to Elizabeth Laderman, Philip Lowe, Jona-
than Neuberger, David Pyle, Sherrill Shaffer, PaulaWorth-
ington, and seminar participants at the University of
Melbourne for helpful suggestions; I am also grateful to
Jennifer Soller for competent research assistance.
This paper examines the speed with which abnormal
economic profits vanish in the U.S. banking industry. A
model is developed to infer expected speeds of profit
adjustment from stock market and financial accounting
data, deriving the rate ofadjustment that is most consis-
tent with observed cross-sectional relationships between
bank stock prices and profitability. The model allows
for the possibility that reported accounting income may
be a biased and noisy signal of economic profit. Esti-
mation is performed using generalized nonlinear least
squares on a pooled series ofcross sections. The results
indicate that the expected rate of adjustment tends to
be significantly greater than zero, although smaller than
adjustment speeds found in studies of nonbank firms.
The estimated speed ofadjustmentfor negative profits is
greaterthanfor positiveprofits;for banks with highprofit
rates, the adjustment speed is near zero, implying that
supernormal profits are very long-lived.
This paper examines the expected path ofbank profitsover
time, with an emphasis on the persistence of abnormal
profits at the individual bank level. A method is developed
to infer the persistence of economic profits from stock
market and financial accounting data for a cross section of
banking firms. Specifically, a rate of profit adjustment is
derived that is most consistent with the observed cross-
sectional relationship between stock prices and profitabil-
ity,with slowerimplied rates of adjustment indicating that
the market believes bank profits are more persistent.
Banking presents an interesting case, since government
regulatory policies shelter the industry from outside forces
to some extent. These policies are introduced for various
reasons related to the stability of the financial system, but
as an unintended side effect they may tend to discourage
vigorous competition as well. On the other hand, regula-
tors generally recognize that competition yields both static
and dynamic efficiency benefits, and therefore attempt to
encourage a degree of interbank competition that stops
short .of causing financial instability.1 If these opposing
strains within bank regulation havethe net effect of weak-
ening competitive forces relative to other industries, bank
profits should reflect that fact, and abnormal bank profits
should be more persistent.
Using a sample of U.S. banks, I find that stock market
investors implicitly believe that competitive forcesoperate
in banking, as profits do tend toward zero overtime. How-
ever, the implied rates of adjustment are slow, suggesting
that nonzero economic profits tend to be quite persistent.
The results are conditionalonthe model of stockvaluation' . ,
if the stock price model is valid and the stock market
efficiently reflects information, the implied adjustment
speeds can be taken as important and valuable information
about industry dynamics. Although I apply these tech-
niques specifically tobanking, theyshouldbe applicable to
other industries as well.
Section II discusses the reasons that profits might not
always be zero, and why adjustment toward zero profit
equilibrium might take time. Section III describes a few
1. For example, current regulations require the denial of bank applica-
tions for mergers, acquisitions, or certain other activities if approval
would substantially reduce competition.4 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
previous studies of price and profit persistence. Persistent
profits and their effect on market value are modeled in
Section IV. Section V resolves some issues related to
the use of accounting profit data. Section VI develops the
estimation framework, Section VII describes the data set
used in the paper, and Section VIII presents the basic
estimation results. The possibility of asymmetric profit
adjustmentis addressedin SectionIX. SectionXconsiders
questions raised by the existence of imperfectly priced
deposit insurance. Section XI summarizes the paper and




Basic, textbook microeconomic theory asserts that eco-
nomicprofitsare zero inperfectlycompetitiveequilibrium:
Profits arejustsufficient to provide anormal risk-adjusted
return on capital. But the notion of zero profit equilibrium
embodiesaninherently static viewofmarketsandcompeti-
tion; any realistic depiction of dynamic competition must
allowforthe possibilitythat profitsinacompetitive market
might diverge from zero, if only temporarily. A positive
difference between the return on equity capital and the
opportunity cost of investing that capital can be called a
"positive spread."
Afirmearns positive spreadsthrougheitherluckorskill.
The firm might benefit from unanticipated exogenous
shocks that affect demand or production functions, shocks
that collectively constitute "luck." Among these might be
poor decisions bycompetitors that enhancethe firm's com-
petitive position (forexample,thatmakethefirm'sproducts
relatively more attractive) without any action by the firm
itself.Beyondtheseexternalforces,alikelycharacteristic of
competitive markets is that producers strive to make op-
portunities toearn positive spreads. Positivespreads might
be created through cost-reducing process innovations that
cannot be copied immediately by other producers, or
through product differentiation that confers a degree of
market power enabling producers to sell at prices above
marginal cost. In either case, the consequent benefits may
exceedthecosts ofinnovatingordifferentiating. Sincemost
firmscontinuously attempt tocreatepositivespreads, atany
pointin time it is likelythat somefirmswillhavesucceeded
at least temporarily, creating some degree of dispersion of
profit rates within an industry.
Some sources of positive spreads are intrinsically tem-
porary,and decay naturally over time, all else equal. Other
spreads are eliminated through competition. Severaltypes
of competitive forces might be expected to drive firms'
profits back toward zero and eliminate short-run diver-
gences from zero profit equilibrium. One likely mecha-
nism is entry: Positive spreads encourage the introduction
of new capacity, either by existing competitors or through
actual entry by new competitors. Competitors attempt to
duplicatethe advantagesof successful firmsthrough imita-
tion of product or process innovations. In some cases the
threat of entry-or a demonstration that the market is
contestable-might be sufficient to eliminate positive
spreads with no actual entry occurring. If several firms
have nonzero spreads arising from identical or similar
sources, interfirm rivalry might provide a second mecha-
nism to dissipate excess profits. Yet another route for
adjustment is migration of demand to substitute products
(which may themselves migrate in product characteristic
space to become closer substitutes to highly profitable
products). Finally, if markets for factors of production are
not perfectly competitive, factor prices might change to
allow suppliers to capture part of the rents inherent in the
positive spreads; for example, wages might rise.
Some combination of these adjustment mechanisms is
likely, but full adjustment probably takes time. Various
factors affect the speed of adjustment. These factors may
be classified as either structural characteristics of bank-
ing markets, or aspects of the conduct of competitors in
those markets. Among the more important structural char-
acteristics is the cost of acquiring and using information:
the cost to existing and potential competitors of observing
relevant data about products, technology, and prices, and
then analyzing or making sense of those data to formulate
strategy. Other important structural characteristics relate
to the speed with which producers and consumers can re-
spond to new information. The cost of many of these ad-
justments may be convex as a function of the size of the
adjustment per period, and therefore lower if adjustment
takes place slowlyover time. Examples include the cost of
adding appropriate capacity (acquiring technology, build-
ing facilities, hiring or training specialized staff), the cost
of altering characteristics of products or their pricing, and
the cost to customers of switching to a different producer.
In addition to structural characteristics, the conduct of
various playersmay also matter a great deal. For example,
firms with positive spreads may act to obscure vital infor-
mation about aspects of the market or may take other steps
to raise the cost of entry.Finally,government regulatory or
other policies may either inhibit or encourage adjustment
in certain industries.
The more significant the impediments to competitive
adjustment are in a particular market or industry, the
slower the adjustment will be, and the further that market
or industry will depart from the perfectly competitive
norm. The persistence of positive economic profits, or the
extent to which nonzero profits in one period tend to besustained in future periods, therefore might be considered
an indicator of market competitiveness. A "competitive"
market is one that rapidly reachieves competitive (zero
profit) equilibrium.s
Firms also may havenegative economic profits, earning
less than the normal return to capital. No firm would
intentionally create such a "negative spread" for itself;
negative spreads arise through unsuccessful product inno-
vation, overestimation of demand, process experimenta-
tion gone awry,relative successes ofcompetitors, orsimple
misfortune. Whatever the source, negative spreads also
represent disequilibria. The return to equilibrium occurs
through exit, broadly defined: Abandonment ofunsuccess-
ful processes orproducts, reduction ofcapacity,orperhaps
even the disappearance of firms from the market. As with
positive-profit disequilibria, adjustment is unlikely to be
instantaneous, so negative spreads may persist as well.3
m. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
OF COMPETITIVE ADJUSTMENT
I am aware ofno previous papers that look directly at the
persistence ofbank profits, although profitpersistence has
been examined in other industries." For example, Mueller
(1977) examines changes in the profitability rankings of
firms; Mueller (1986) deals with profit persistence and
related issues in more depth. Geroski and Jacquemin
(1988)presentdata on rates ofprofitchange fora sampleof
industrial firms in three European countries. These studies
examine the convergence of profitability to a long-run
mean value, either for industries or for the economy as
a whole; without exception, theyexclude banks. Relevant
conclusions from previous studies are discussed in Sec-
tion VIII.
Several studies in the banking literature examine the
loosely related issue of price "stickiness." For example,
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) assess the speed with which
interest rates on retail bank deposits change when mar-
ket interest rates change; Hannan and Berger (1991) exam-
ine the frequency of deposit rate changes. These price
2. Conceivably, the frequency with which nonzero profits arise also
might be relevant, although frequent deviations from zero profitsmight
simply indicate a high rate of innovation within the industry.
3. The term "equilibrium" as used here refers to long-run steady-state
equilibrium. Ifadjustment to demand and supply shocks occurs over
several periods, changes may follow some optimal path, with each
period's outcome therefore representing a short-run equilibrium. In the
terminology of this paper, the intermediate states all are referred to as
points of disequilibrium.
4. Unpublished work by Gup, Lau, Mattheiss, and Walter(1992)sheds
indirect light on the persistence ofbank profits.Therelevantresultsfrom
their Markov analysis are discussed below.
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adjustment studies generally focus on the effect of market
structure-primarilythe number and relative size of com-
petitors-on price adjustment. The idea that firms in
concentrated markets might have some degree of market
power anduse ittomanipulateprices intheirfavor(dynam-
ically as well as statically) is intuitively plausible. Such
firms could act to accelerate or retard the rate at which
prices adjust to supply and demand shocks, affecting the
speed of adjustment when the equilibrium point shifts.
However,Worthington (1989) points out that the relation-
ship between market structure and the degree of price
stickiness is theoretically ambiguous; markets charac-
terized by fewer firms might have either faster or slower
rates of price adjustment. 5
Despite the theoretical ambiguity, the deposit rate stud-
ies generally find that banks in more concentrated markets
havebeen slowerto change interest rates on deposits when
market rates change. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) find
evidence of asymmetry: Banks in concentratedmarkets are
less likely to raise rates when market rates rise, but more
likely to reduce them when market rates fall; the asym-
metry thus runs in the banks' favor. However, the pric-
ing results must be interpreted with some caution. Bank
deposits are multidimensional products; if deposit rate
changes are costly for banks, then banks may find it less
expensive to adjust other aspects of the deposit product
when market conditions change. Prices might appear to be
sticky even if full, multidimensional adjustment is rapid
and continuous.
Overall, the price stickiness literature suggests the pres-
ence offactorsin thebanking industry thatcould leadtothe
persistence ofdisequilibria. Prices that are slowto adjust to
exogenouschanges might be onemanifestation ofthetypes
ofimpedimentstocompetitive adjustment discussed above
in Section II.Ifthesefactorscreate arate ofadjustment that
is materially slower than in other industries, then bank
profits may be measurably more sticky as well.
IV. PROFIT PERSISTENCE AND MARKET VALUE
LetR it, represent the rate of economic return fora discrete
period (taken to be one year) on beginning-of-period
shareholder equity for bank i at time t. I model this return
as the sum of a longer-term component, Rit, and a transi-
torycomponent, 'YJit' sothatRit=Rit+'TJit. I assume that 'YJit
5. Worthington (1989)demonstrates that price stickiness increases with
seller concentration, all else equal, but falls with the conjectural
variation parameter (a measure of the extent of collusive/cooperative
behavior in setting output levels), which probably also rises with
concentration; hence, structure and conduct may have offsetting effects
on price stickiness.6 FRBSFEcoNOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2





acrossfirms. Economic profits differfromzeroifR it=fki,
whichcanoccureitherbecauseRit differs from ki, orasa
resultoftransitory shocks ('l1it =f0).Competition generally
pushes Rit toward ki , and in perfectly competitive equi-
librium, spreads arezero, withRit = ki •
It is important to understandthe distinctions between
the different rates of return defined here. The required
return k, is the return an investor can expectto earn on
the firm'ssharesif purchased in the secondary market. It
is theopportunity costofcapital.Exante, thatratecanbe
estimatedfromanassetpricingmodel,suchasthesingle-
factorCapitalAssetPricing Modelused. below. Ifafirmis
earningeconomic rents,aninvestorfortunate enoughtobe
abletoinvestadollardirectly inthefirm'sassets-through
reinvestment ofearnings orthroughthepurchase ofnewly
issuedshares, asopposed tosecondary sharepurchases-
will participate in those rents and receive a return that
exceeds theopportunity costki• Theexpected value ofthis
rate of return on equity is Rit• Efficient capital markets
adjustthepriceofshares sothattheexpected returninthe
secondary marketis always ki , butadjustments inmarkets
forthegoods andservices producedbythefirm (orforthe
inputsconsumed bythe firm) are necessary if Rit is to be
driventoki • Amaintained assumption ofthispaperisthat
capital markets are efficient, but markets for goods and
services may not be, so that market poweror the other
impediments to complete and instantaneous adjustment
discussed above could lead to observed differences be-
tweenR,andk,atanypointintime. Afirmwithapositive
spreadhas Rit>ki bydefinition. 6
Modeling thepathofRitasapartialadjustment process
withadjustment speed X. gives:
(1)
or
Rit = Rit- 1 - X.(Rit_ 1 - kJ,
thatpolarcase,oncea wedge betweenR andk develops, it
lastsforever. Intermediate values of X. implythattherateof
returnonequitygradually moves toward k inthelongrun.
The actual speed of adjustment depends on aspects of
structure and conduct within the industry, as discussed
above.
Time SeriesversusCross Section
Given observations or estimates of R, and k.; the adjust-
ment parameter X. in principle could be estimated from
time-series data, either for individual firms or for the
industryas a whole. However, time-series methods gener-
ally require eitherthat X. be constantover time or that it
change in some systematic way. The size, speed, and
unpredictability of recentchanges in the financial sector,
andespecially inbanking, makeitunlikely that X. wouldbe
sufficiently stable over a period long enough to permit
confident statistical estimation. Time-series estimates of
the adjustment speedtherefore maybe untrustworthy. 7
Analternative approach, takenhere, istoinferthespeed
of adjustment fromthe market capitalizations of banking
firms. Ifsharemarkets areefficient, sharepricesincorpo-
ratemarketexpectations ofthefuturestreamofeconomic
earnings;thatis,thepathoftheexpectedRiJort= 1...00 is
embedded in the current market value of equity MiO'
AlthoughRitand X.cannotbeobserved directly, theimplicit
values used bythe marketto evaluate bank shares can be
calculated. Inferring Rit and X. requires aniappropriate
modeloftherelationship between MiOandtheRit path;the
values inferred arethenconditional onmarketbeliefs and
on the modelused to replicatemarketpricing. I assume
thattheadjustment speedis thesameforallfirms, sothat
cross-sectional estimation is possible.
A Model ofMarketValue withPersistent Profits
A simplefinancial modelof the value of shares" specifies
thatthecurrentmarketvalue ofequityattimet = 0isequal
(2) (Rit - ki) = (1 - X.) (Rit_1 - kJ.
Thus, if X. is equal to one, adjustment is essentially
instantaneous, in that nonzero spreads vanish withinone
period of their appearance. If X. is equal to zero, no
adjustment occurs,andspreads areinfinitely persistent; in
6. Iassumethroughoutthatproducersaredifferentiatedtosomedegree,
so thatR; and k, mayvaryacrossbanks. The differentiation may stem
from variations in product characteristics, or from differences in the
geographiclocationofproductsforwhichvaluedependstosomedegree
on proximityto the consumer, asis likelyin thecaseofretaildeposits.
7. Thelikelyinstabilityofthecompetitiveadjustmentspeedmightseem
to questionthe assumptionthat Ais independentof t in equation (1).
However, Acan be viewedas an expectation basedon currentinforma-
tion;I assumethatAis notexpectedtochangesystematically overtime.
This assumption about expectations is necessary for cross-sectional
estimation.(Theassumptionmaybeviolatedif,forexample, changesin





8. A similarmodelisdeveloped byWilcox(1984), althoughthatmodel
has an arbitraryfinitehorizon, and implicitlyassumesthat the rate of(10)
to the discounted value of expected future cash flowsCFit
for firm i:
(3)
Expected cash flow is defined as expected economic earn-
ings flowing to equity, net of any reinvestment or new
equity contributions." Letting Eit represent total contrib-
uted (including previously reinvested) equity at date t (the
end of periodt), and defining gitas therate ofincrease inE,
during period t, expected economic earnings at date t are
equal to RitEit_1, and new investment is equal to gitEit-l'
Then expected cash flow for bank i at date tis:
(4) cr; = (Rit - git)Eit-l.
However, only the realizations of variables at t = 0 or
earlierpoints in time can be observed currently, so(4)must
berewrittento express cash flowatany t interms ofcurrent
values. Recursive substitution in (2) yields an expression
for the spread (Rit- kt) in terms of the current spread
between RiO and ki:
(5) (Rit - kJ = (1 - A)t(RiO - ki).
Rearranging gives an expression forRitin terms of current
values:
(6) Rit = (1 - A)t(RiO - kJ + k..
Note that at t=0 the expected return and its realization are
identical and equal to RiO'
I make the simplifying assumptionthat therate ofequity
investment is expectedto be constantfor each firm, so that
git= gi for all t>O. (This corresponds, for example, to a
constant "plowback" rate for earnings.)Itdirectly follows
that contributed equity evolves over time according to
Eit= (1+gJEit-l.Interms of thecurrent valueEiO' contrib-
uted equity at future dates can be written as:
(7) Eit_1 = (1 + gY'-lEiQ.
. Substituting (6) and (7) into the cash flow equation (4)
yields:
(8) CFit = ((1-A)t(RiO- ki) + ki- gi)(1+giy-1EiQ'
Finally, substitution back into the equity market valuation
equation (3) gives:
00 ((1-AY(RiO- ki) +ki- gi)(1+gy-1EiQ
(9) MiO= t~-l 1 k ( + iY
competitive adjustment is zero and that accounting returns accurately
represent economic returns. The model of PIE ratios in Leibowitz and
Kogelman (1990) is in the same spirit.
9. This definition of cash flow roughly corresponds to total divi-
dends paid, although it also accounts for new equity contributed by
stockholders.
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Since all variables in (9) are as oft = 0, the time subscripts
on M. R· and E. can be suppressed to simplify notation; l' Z' l
from this point forward, these variables should be under-
stood to have an implicit time subscript of O.
This expression can be simplified furtherbysplitting the
infinite sum into two separate summations and applying
the useful fact that I xt = x/(l - x) as follows:10
t= 1
I. ((1-A)t(Ri- ki)+ki- g)(1+gy-1
t=l (1+k)t
= (_1_) [(R.-k.) I. ((I-A)(I+gi))t
1+gi I I t= 1 (1+ki)
~ (l+ gi )t] + (ki-gi)t~l 1+k
i
(Ri - ki)(I- A)
+1.
ki-gi+A(l+gJ
Thus, the market value of equity can be written as:
(R.- k-)(I- A)E.




Additional insight into the model is gained bydividing (11)
by E, to create an analog of the commonly constructed
market-to-book ratio:
Mi _ _ ( (I-A) ) +1
(12) Ei - (R, ki) ki-gi+ A(l+gJ .
Equation (12) shows that the divergence between market
value and contributed equity for firm i is positively related
to (R,- k), the spread between the actual economic rate of
return on equity and the required rate of return. If R, = ki ,
thenM/E,= 1;acompanywithoutapositive spread has no
surplus value to pass along to shareholders in the form of
higher equity value." The effect of any given spread
10. Of course, this relation requires Ixl<1 for the sum to converge. For
(10), the restrictions on the summands require only that X. be nonnega-
tive and that k exceed g. Both conditions should be satisfied in general:
>..~O is necessary for dynamic stability of the adjustment model, and
k<g could occur only if a firm were expected to invest foreverat a rate
exceeding the market rate of return on equity.
11.TheMIEratio, which is thecurrentmarket valueofequity divided by
the value of equity contributions, can be related to Tobin's q (Tobinand
Brainard, 1977).Ifthe market value of bank liabilities is assumed to be
equal to the book value of those liabilities, then q>1 if and only if
MIE>1,and similarly forq<1and q= 1.The implicationsofqequal to
or different from 1 would apply to MIE as well, subject to the usual
qualifications relatedto the distinctionbetween average q and marginal
q. The relationship between MIE and R - k implies that the cases in
which R is not equal to k also correspond conceptually to values of
Tobin's q different from one; in competitive equilibriumR=k,M=E,
andq=1.8 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
.VI. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
I assume that accounting returns are related to nontrans-
itory economic returns as follows:
Substituting R, from (14)into (11) yields:
M. = (ROEi- <Y - Ei-ki)(I-A)Ei
(15) I ki- gi+ A(1 +gJ + n;
where ROEiis the accounting return onequity att= O. The
parameter <Y is an unobserved industry-wide bias in-re-
ported earnings incorporating two types of effects: (i) dis-
tortions due to the failure of accounting practices to. reflect
economic realities, and (ii) the cross-sectional mean of
transitory shocks to rates of return at t= O. Profits also are
affected byanunobserved firm-specificdeviation Ei, which
like <Y subsumes any transitory shocks that cause Ri to
differ fromRi , as wellas any distortionary accounting con-
ventions peculiar to individual firms. Firm-specific devia-
tions may be the result of events with dissimilar impact on
different firms (for example, the effect of a given interest
rate shock depends on the structure of a bank's portfolio);
alternatively, they may reflect divergent choices in the
application of accounting principles if generally accepted
accounting permits some degree of latitude. Solving equa-
tion (13)for R, gives:
Ri = ROEi - <Y - Ei .
ROEi = <Y + R, + Ei ,
(14)
(13)
This equation can be viewed either as a model ofhow the
market forms beliefs regarding R, from accounting ROEi,
or simply as a means to deduce a market estimate of R,
using the biased and noisyinformation in ROEi.
Forestimation, theunobserved firm-specificdeviation is
treated as a random variable in cross section, with the Ei
identically distributed with the same variance for each
firm, and zero mean across firms. This formulation ad-
dresses the F-M criticisms of accounting returns. It is
consistent with the possibility, stressed by F-M, that for
any two firms i and j, ROEi>ROEj but Ri<Rj . Given a
statistical distribution of E, such an occurrence in the data
has some well-defined likelihood; there is always some
probability that a bank with a higher observed ROE does
not actually have a higher economic rate of return R. In
fact, such an apparent "anomaly" may be very likelyif the
variance of Ei is large. That the probability is positive, or
even large, does not imply that accounting ROE is void of
information. For a given distribution of E, the larger the
difference in ROE between two firms, the less likely it is
that the relationship between economic returns runs in the
opposite direction.
Practical application of equation (11) requires knowledge
ofthe rate of economic return on equity R; Noestablished
methods exist for computing such economic profit rates.
Accountingincome can be observed and areturn onequity
computed; however, a variety of well-known peculiarities
of accounting practice make it unlikely that accounting.
returns will be equal to the underlying nontransitory eco-
nomic rate of return.
Fisher and McGowan (1983; hereafter, F-M) are widely
cited as demonstrating that accounting returns cannot
proxyforeconomicreturns. F-Mpresent severalnumerical
examples to establish their key propositions. As Mueller
(1986) notes, F-Mdemonstrate that use of accounting data
can lead to serious errors, but neither their examples nor
theory can prove that the problems are material in practice.
The many studies that find relationships between account-
ing returns and other economic variables make it implaus-
ible that in practice those returns contain no information
about economic returns, as F-M appear to argue (see
Mueller, 1986,pp. 107-108). However,it wouldbe naive to
argue the opposite, that accounting data portray underlying
economic flows with perfect accuracy. A prudent inter-
pretation of F-Mis that accounting returns are potentially
misleading, and maybe both biased andnoisy asindicators
of economic returns; the possible bias and imprecision
must be recognized within any model that uses accounting
data.
The cash flowdefinition in equation (4) adjusts for some
ofthe factors most commonly believedto make accounting
and economic returns differ. For example, if an arbitrary
schedule for the amortization of intangible assets im-
properly reduces reported income in a period, it also
causes the net value of assets to decline by more than is
economically appropriate during the period. The relative
reduction in assets (and equity) tends to reduce measured
growth g, offsetting the inappropriatereduction in the rate
of return on equity. In practice, this offset is not complete
because g is assumed constant over time for each firm;
some allowance for possible errors in reported earnings
still must be introduced.
V. ACCOUNTING PROFITS
AND ECONOMIC PROFITS
between R, and k, on the M)Ei ratio depends on A in an
intuitively appealing way: Faster speeds of adjustment to
equilibrium-meaning less persistence in profits-imply
smaller differences between M, and Ei . If A= 1, then
Mi=Ei. Ifspreads are more durable (Ais closer to zero)
then any difference between R, and ki will persist longer,
and those abnormal returns raise the market valueofequity
relative to Ei .LEVONIAN/ PERSISTENCE OF BANK PROFITS 9
VIT. DATA
Wilcox 1984 as an examplej.P Denoting the GSSE from
the null model as GSSEo, a generalized goodness-of-fit
statistic is computed as:
(GSSEo- GSSE)
F = GSSE x DFR,
A sample of U.S. banks and bank holding companies with
exchange-traded shares was drawn from Standard and
Poors' Compustat database.P Sincebanking assets domi-
nate most of the holding companies, all of the institutions
in the sample are simplycalled"banks" throughout thepa-
per. Cross-sectional data sets wereconstructedfortheends
of the second and fourth quarters (June and December) for
each of the six years from 1986 through 1991;these dates
are denoted as 86:II through 9l:IY. Banks were included in
the sample if (i) the necessary market and financial data
existed foreach sample date; (ii)nomore than twomonthly
stock price observations were missing overthe period 81:II
through 9l:IV (the sample period plus the 60 months
preceding thefirstsample date); and (iii)the stockprice did
not fall below one dollar at the close of any of those
months. Of the roughly 150 banks in the Compustat
database, 83 survived this screening.
Market capitalizationM;foreach firm wascalculated as
price per share multiplied by the number of outstanding
shares, both as of the quarterly financial reporting date;
contributed equity E;was approximated bythe book value
of equity at that same date.14 By definition, g;should equal
the annual growth rate of E;;g;was estimated as the aver-
age growth in book equity overtheprevious fiveyears. The
return on equity ROE; wascomputed as the sum ofthe four
(19)
where DFR is the ratio of the denominator's degrees of
freedom to the numerator's degrees of freedom for the first
term in (19).This is analogous to the familiar regression F
statistic that is isomorphic to the R2 statistic in linear
estimation.
(17)
where IN isthe N-dimensional identity matrix, andI is a
TxT matrix with error variances for each period on the
diagonal and intertemporal covariances off the diagonal.
The coefficientestimates minimizeageneralized sumof
squared errors:
(The time subscripts in (16) refer to sample dates, in
contrast to the time subscripts used in Section IV above,
which referred to future periods viewedfrom a singlepoint
in time.) The coefficients of equation (16)can beestimated
using nonlinearleast squares from pooled cross sectionsof
N firms at each of T sample dates.
The firm-specific E;t are assumed to be independently
and identically distributed with zero mean in cross section
at each sample date t. However, the variance of the Eit
need not be the same for all t. In addition, the error terms
may not be independent across sample dates; forexample,
a bank with large E at one date may be likely to havelarge
values at other dates as well. To account for such possi-
bilities, the variance structure of the E;t is assumed
to be:
Forstatistical estimation of the parameters ex and A, this
relationshipis assumed tohold in cross sectionat anypoint
in time. The coefficient ex may vary in sign and magnitude
across sample dates, since the shocks that cause ROE;
to differ fromR; mayvaryovertime. The adjustment speed
A also may vary, since at any point in time it reflects
the market's expectation of the future path of profits
conditional on available information. To account for such
variation, time subscripts are added to all variables and
parameters in (15). With this notational change,solvingfor
the spread between ROE; and k; yields a more readily
estimable form with an additive firm-specific error term:
(18)
where S is the estimate ofI and Eis the residual vector.In
essence, this is a nonlinear version of seemingly unrelated
regressions. Approximate standard errors for each coef-
ficient are computed as the square root of the correspond-
ing diagonal element of the matrix (G'(S-l@IN)G)-l,
where G is the NT-by-2T Jacobian matrix of first partial
derivatives. To measure the fit of the model, the GSSE for
the model is compared to the GSSE from a null model
specified as ext = At= 0 for all sample dates t: this null
model corresponds to the textbook constant growth ac-
countingcashflowmodel with nodynamic adjustment (see
12. Another interesting null model might be the case of A= 1, which
corresponds conceptually to unitary Tobin's qat all times. A model with
A= 1 also has constantly growing cash flows, but those cash flows
provide only a normal return on equity. However,such a model fits the
data so poorly that it seems an unlikely alternate hypothesis, and thus
does not present a useful standard for goodness-of-fit.
13. Foreign banking organizations issuing American Depository Re-
ceipts are included inCompustat; theywereexcluded fromthis analysis.
Subsidiaries of foreign banks were left in the sample.
14.This approximationis common in banking research; see forexample
Keeley (1990). Book value may be a reasonable proxy for the replace-
ment value of bank equity, since bank assets and liabilities are short
term, and therefore tum over relatively frequently.10 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
preceding quarters' net income divided by book equity as
of the beginning of the first of those four quarters. (Forex-
ample, ROE for 86:II is the sum of quarterly earnings for
85:III, 85:IV, 86:1,and 86:II, divided bybook equity as of
85:II.) Fifteen banks reporting a rate of return on equity
of less than -50 percent were dropped from the sample.15
Drawing the sample from Compustat introduces the
possibility that the results may not typify all firms within
the banking industry, sinceCompustat includes only banks
with publicly traded equity and such institutions tend to be
larger than the average firm. For example, as of 91:IV the
banks in the sample ranged from $355 million to $217
billion in assets, with a mean of $20 billion and a median
of $7 billion; in contrast, the mean for the entire U.S.
banking industry at that date was $257 million in assets.
On the other hand, precisely because they are large, these
firms account fornearly two-thirds oftheassets oftheU.S.
banking sector, and therefore may provide a useful picture
of the industry.
The Equilibrium Return on Equity
The firm-specific cost of equity ki wascalculatedusing the
Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model, using meth-
ods recommended by Ibbotson Associates (1991) for com-
puting discount rates for long-term investments. Beta
coefficients were estimated for each bank using monthly
stock returns for the preceding 60 months." Annualized
required rates of return on equity were constructed from
the betas by adding a base Treasury bond rate to the
productofthe estimatedbeta and amarket risk premium of
stocks overTreasury securities. Ibbotson Associates report
an average equity premium of about seven percentage
points, with only minor differences depending on the bond
maturity used; accordingly,0.07istaken asthe market risk
premium.
Most references onpractical calculationofrisk-adjusted
rates of return (forexample, Copeland, Koller,and Murrin
1990, and Ibbotson Associates 1991)recommend using a
rate on medium or long-term Treasury bonds as the risk-
free rate to construct discount rates for equity cash flows.
This leavesopen afairly wide range ofpossible maturities.
15. Within the simple partial adjustment model of profit persistence,
sufficiently negative rates of return on equity can imply negative market
values, which are impossible under limited liability. The elimination of
banks with large negative profits is a stopgap solution; more elegant
approaches might allow for the rate of profit adjustment to be faster for
these very unprofitable firms.
16. Returns were computed as the change in the log of the monthly
closing stockprice. One firm, LandmarkBancshares, had negative betas
for some dates; it was dropped from the sample.
A rough estimate of the "modified duration" of the bank
stocks in the sample was constructed by computing the
theoretical partial derivative of market value with respect
to k. On average for this sample, a 100basis point increase
in k reduced market value by approximately 23 percent,
suggesting a duration of about 23 years. However, it is
unlikely that changes in k would occur without some
change inother variables, most notablyR, the rate ofreturn
on equity; this is especially true for banks. IfR changes in
the same direction as k, then the partial derivative with
respect to k overstates the duration of equity. Under the
alternative assumption that changes in Rand k are equal
(parallel shifts in all rates of return), the average duration
falls to approximately 10years. The true duration of these
stocks is probably somewhere between the extremes of 10
and 23 years.17 A rate on 20-yearTreasury bondsmight be
ideal, as the duration typically would fall in the desired
range, but consistentdata arenotavailableforthatmaturity.
However,sincethere is generally a difference of only a few
basis points between any ofthe maturities from 10yearson
out, the rate on lO-yearTreasuries is used as the risk-free
rate for the CAPM calculations. Sensitivity analysis (dis-
cussed below) shows that the main results of the paper are
robust to changes in assumptions regarding k.
Vlll. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The model was estimated from the pooled cross sections
using equation (16). Figure 1presents the resulting adjust-
ment coefficients (the Ait) graphically. The shaded band
reflects a 95 percent confidence interval based on the
standard errors of the estimates, with the point estimates
given by the solid line in the middle of the band. The
estimated adjustment speeds are not significantly different
from zero during the period 88:II-90:II, but otherwise
significantly exceed zero, reaching a high of 0.082 in
87:IY. A conservative conclusion is that the market be-
lievescompetitiveforcesoperate in thebanking industry to
push economic profits towardzero, although theforces are
not strong and at times may be nonexistent. Moreover, in
all periods Aclearly is significantly less than the value of
1.0 that would characterize an ideal world of frictionless
instantaneous adjustment to zero profit equilibrium.
To put the adjustment speeds in perspective, A can be
reinterpreted in terms of the time required for nonzero
spreads to decay. Corresponding to each A is an implicit
17. Such a range also is consistent with the likely range of asset and
liability durations for banks. For example, with 8 percent capital, asset
duration of 1.5 years, and liability duration of 0.5 years, the balance
sheet identity implies an equity duration of 13 years.LEVONIAN/ PERSISTENCE OF BANK PROFITS 11
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half-life of positive or negative spreads. From (5), the
number of years h required for any initial spread between
RiO andk,tofallbyhalfcan becalculatedbysetting(1-A)h
equal to 12, or:
h = -log(2)
log(l-A)
Excluding the five consecutive periods for which the
estimated A is not significantly different from zero, h
ranges from 8.1 years in 87:IV to 13.2 years in 91:IY.
Figure2 presents theresults fortheROEbias coefficient
a, again with a 95 percent confidence interval shaded
around the central line of point estimates. As the figure
shows, almost all of the estimates of a are negative,
implying that the stock market prices bank shares as if
accounting ROE understates expected economic returns.
In seven of the twelve sample periods, the estimates of a
are significantly negative at the 5 percent level.
Forthe setofestimates illustrated inFigures 1and2, the
goodness-of-fitmeasure defined in equation (19)was9.93.
This statistic is roughly comparable to the conventional
F statistic testing the restrictions of a null model with
a = A= 0 for all periods, for which the 5 percent critical
value is 1.53 in this case. The difference suggests that
allowing for persistent profits and biased accounting may
add significantly to thefitofthe cashflowvaluationmodel.
Sensitivity to the AssetPricing Model
The constructedequilibrium rates of return on stockholder
equity k reflectmany relativelyarbitrary assumptions. The
beta coefficients used to calculate the individual k. are I
themselves subject to estimation error, and the simple
CAPM may not even be an appropriate model of returns,
particularly for banks (for example, see Flannery and
James1984).Thus, the robustness oftheresults to errors in
k must be examined.
As one test of the sensitivity of the results to potential
errors, the individual k, were replaced at each date by the
average k for all of the sample banks in that period. This
substitution eliminates all interfirm differences in the as-
sumed equilibrium return. The model was then reesti-
mated; the resulting adjustment coefficients were little
different from the results reported in Figure 1. The model
also wasreestimated under severalalternative assumptions
about the CAPM parameters: The assumed risk-free rate
was raised and lowered by 1 percentage point, and the
market risk premium wasraised and loweredby 1percent-
age point. In all cases, the resulting estimates of the
adjustmentspeed were well within one standard error of
the original estimates for each period.
As one final sensitivity test, required returns were set
uniformly equal to the averageROEforthe sample at each
date. This case is of more than passing interest, since
previous studies of profit persistence (Mueller 1986, and
Geroski and Jacquemin 1988) use the average accounting12 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
return for the industry as the estimate of the normal or
equilibriumrate of return. Figure 3 shows the estimated
adjustment speed coefficients in the same format as the
earliercharts.Theestimates ofAgenerally arehigherthan
inFigure1, althoughthebasicpatternandoverallconclu-
sions are unchanged. Figure 4 gives the corresponding
estimatesof a., theROEbiascoefficient. Notsurprisingly,
the estimates are insignificantly different from zero for
most periods; if average ROE is the expected long-run
economic rateofreturn,thenobserved ROEforeachbank
is muchmorelikelyto be an accuratereflection of "true"
economic returns. Despitethesedifferences, thekeysub-
stantiveconclusions regarding bankprofitpersistence are
unchanged.
Since in all cases the essentialqualitative conclusions
are the same, it seems safe to infer that the results are
relatively insensitive totherequiredratesofreturnandthat
any errorsintroducedby the assumptions are likely to be
inconsequential. Moreover, the fundamental conclusions
probably wouldberobustunderalternative modelsofbank
stock returns. One notable exception might be a return
modelofthetypesuggested byFamaandFrench(1993), in
whichrequiredstockreturnsdependon variables such as
the sizeof the firm and the price-to-book ratio. Sincethe
price-to-book ratio appears in the estimationabove, and
sincebank size maybe relatedto variables such as prof-
itabilityorthe growth rate,theresultsof themodelmight
besubstantially affectediftheFama-Frenchapproachwere




cross-sectional model by restricting the coefficient esti-
matesacrosssample dates. Besides indicatingwhetherthe
estimates differsignificantly overtime,therestrictedesti-
matesareusefulasroughindicators ofthetypicalvalues of




- 0.044, also with a standarderror of 0.006. Whenboth
coefficients are restricted, the resulting estimates. are A=
0.056anda.= -0.042,bothwithstandarderrorsof0.005.
However, inallcaseslikelihoodratiotestsrejecttherestric-




than the speeds of price adjustment found in studies of





is not'simply an extension of depositrate persistence.
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-0.05The degree ofprofit persistencealso can be comparedto
figures for nonbank firms. Results in Geroski and Jac-
quemin (1988, their Tables 1 and 2) for European firms
imply annual adjustment speeds for profits averaging 0.48
to 0.55. Individual industries range from 0.35 for metal
processing to 0.75 for metal manufacturing and 0.68 for
chemicals and automobiles.
Themost extensive previous study of profit persistence
is the book by Mueller (1986). Several significant dif-
ferences between Mueller's study and the more limited
present paper should be noted. Mueller samples 600 U.S.
firms (none ofthem banks), and constructs a time series of
abnormal profits for each firm covering the period 1950
through 1972.18 Mueller estimates two models: one in
whichthe economicprofitrate converges hyperbolically to
a rate that may differ from the competitive equilibrium
level, and a partia.l adjustment modelthat is more nearly
analogous to the model of returns in equation (5) above. In
the partial adjustment model, Mueller's results imply
profit adjustment speeds ranging from 0.434 for the 100
highest profit firms to 0.546 for the 100 lowest profit
firms .19 Comparing these results to Figure 1, Mueller's
adjustment speeds are well above any reasonable confi-
dence interval for the estimated values ofAin the banking
industry, implyingthatbankprofits are significantly slower
to adjust than are profits in other industries. A degree of
cautionis appropriate, since the estimation methods differ
considerably between Mueller (1986) and the present pa-
per. Figure 3 may provide a bettercomparison, sincethose
estimates incorporate an assumption parallel to Mueller's,
namely that returns tend toward their average. Even the
higher adjustment speeds in Figure 3 are well below
Mueller's estimates.
Mueller also finds that the firms with the highest prof-
itability have significantly more persistent profits. Some
related evidence for the banking industry emerges from
Gup, Lau, Mattheiss, and Walter (1992). Gup, et al., com-
pute Markov transition probabilities for banks in various
states of asset size and profitability, as measured byreturn
on assets (ROA). Each ROA state is defined to be 5 per-
centage points wide, with the median state at -.03 to
+.02. Gup, et aI., find that banks in the ROA state just
above the medianhavea lower probabilityofmoving to the
median state each period than do banks in the ROA state
18.Unlike the presentstudy,Mueller takesaveragepre-interestreturnon
assets as the estimateof the normal profit rate; theconstructedeconomic
returns therefore do not allow for differences in risk across firms.
19. Note that Mueller structures his model to estimate a persistence
parameter rather than an adjustment parameter; thus the "A" he
estimatesis equal to 1- Aas defined in this paper.
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just below the median, .39 versus .58. 20 These results
suggest the need to allow for possible asymmetries in
adjustment; this idea is developed further in the next
section. 21
IX. ASYMMETRY IN PROFIT ADJUSTMENT
There are good theoretical reasons to suspect that sym-
metric treatment of positive and negative spreads is inap-
propriate. For example, firms with positive spreads may
take steps to extend, protect, and prolong those spreads if
the marginalbenefitof such actions outweighs their margi-
nal cost. Firms with negative spreads, on the other hand,
probably attempt to eliminate or reverse the situation as
rapidly as possible. Moreover, ifinformation is imperfect,
a determinant ofthe rate of adjustment may be the speed
with which any situation of nonzero economic profits is
recognized, its sources understood, and appropriate ac-
tions taken in response. Fora firm with apositive spread, it
is outsiders who must notice the advantage, decide what
has created that nonzero spread, and figure out how to
replicate what the successful firm is doing. Outside ob-
servers face a filtering problem, since positive profits for
one firm may be the result of transitory shocks to rates of
return. A firm with a competitive edge might even act to
obscure relevant information from competitors. In con-
trast, negative spreads often may result from a firm's own
miscues, so that much of the information necessary to
make the adjustment is internal and therefore much more
readily available at lower cost. A pronounced information
asymmetry for above-normal profits compared to below-
normal profits would make positive spreads more per-
sistent than negative spreads.
One test for such differences would divide the sample
into two groups according to profitability, firms with Rj?f!;kj
in one group and firms withRj<kjin the other. But asnoted
above, nontransitory economic rates of return on equity R,
are unobservable. A sample division based on the spread
betweenaccountingROEj and kj would result in somefirms
with particularly large positive or negative Ej (transitory
return shocks or accounting distortions) being misclassi-
fied. However, note from equation (12) that Rj<kj if and
only ifMj<Ej; thus, an appropriate division of the sample
results from grouping firms according to whether the ob-
servable M, is greater than or less than the observable Ej •
20. The results cited here are forbanks inthe $500 million to$33 billion
range, the only group in Gup, et al., for which any banks diverge from
the median ROA state.
21. However, Gup, et al., also find that the few banks in ROA states
substantially below the median tend to remain there, which suggests a
more complicated asymmetry than is investigated here.14 FRBSFECONOMIC REvIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
FIGURE 5
The sample was separated accordingly into two groups
for each date around an MJEj ratio of 1.0, and the model
was reestimated allowing Ato differ between the groups.
Figure 5 presents the adjustment speed results for the
profitable firms-that is, those with Mj;;:;'Ej and Rj;;:;'kj-
with unprofitable firms in Figure 6.
ADJUSTMENT SPEED, HIGH-PROFIT BANKS
The results show that restricting Ato be the same across
the entire sample at a given date masks substantial dif-
ferences between profitable and unprofitable firms. Com-
paring the results to Figure 1, profitable firms tend to have
slower adjustment speeds, unprofitable firms faster. The
estimated adjustment speed for profitable firms is signifi-
cantly different from zero foronlythe first4 ofthe12dates.
Adjustment speeds for the unprofitable group tend to be
higher, but vary considerably over the 1986-1991 period,
and tend to have larger standard errors. The lowest values
in 88:II-89:II are insignificantly different from zero. The
high in 86:II is0.25, andthe adjustmentspeed forunprofit-
able banks rises to 0.21 at 91:IV from its trough in 88:IY.
Figure 7 displays the difference between the adjustment
speed coefficients for unprofitable and profitable firms,
with a 95 percent confidence interval for the difference.
The difference is generally positive, significantly so at 8 of
the 12 sample dates, consistent with the hypothesis that
negative spreads disappear more quickly than positive
spreads. As in the symmetric case, a likelihood ratio test
solidlyrejects restricting thecoefficients tobe equal across
time periods.
The results imply that positive spreads in banking are
more persistent than negative spreads. The difference in
the speeds with which R approaches k from above and
below implies a prediction for studies of intraindustry
mobility. Banks that achieve superior performance should
maintain that position for a relatively long time; hence the
same names should appear consistently among the top
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86:II 87:II 88:II 89:1I 90:II 91:IIgroup of banks for severalperiods. The quickerreversalof
situations of low profitability means that firms falling
toward the bottom ranks should tend to climb up fairly
rapidly, to be replaced by other firms suffering setbacks
that push returns below the cost of capital. A rough but
simple testofthisempirical prediction might use anyofthe
many setsofpublishedrankings ofbanks to lookatrelative
turnover inupperandlowerquantiles. Mueller (1977)finds
evidence of such aneffectinhis studyofprofitratesusinga
broad sample of industrial firms.
X. A COMMENT ON CAPITAL RATIOS
AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Federal insurance of bank deposits is a prominent feature
of the U.S. banking system. This section considers the
implications of deposit insurance forthe adjustment speed
results. The insurance pricing schedule in effect at the
sample dates probably led to imperfect pricing of the fed-
eral guarantee.s- Premiums paid by each bank depended
only on the size of the bank as measured by deposits, and
did not reflect other factors that affect the economic value
of the insurance, most notably risk. Itis likely that banks
with a higher probability of failure underpaid for their
insurance; for these banks, the net value would represent
an off-balance-sheet asset. Other banks that overpaid
for insurance bore a net off-balance-sheet liability. (See
Marcus and Shaked 1984, or Ronn and Verma 1986, for
estimates of the fair market value of deposit insurance.)
It is easy to find evidence that the net value of deposit
insurance might be correlated with the profitability of a
bank. Chi-square tests using the data set from this paper
confirm that banks with M/E<1tend to havelowerequity
capital ratios than banks with M/E~I. Conventional the-
ory says that a bank's market capital ratio affects the
probability of failure, and therefore the value of deposit
insurance: Lower ratios raise the valueofthe guarantee, all
else equal. As a result, the value of deposit insurance
probably isrelated tocapital ratiosto someextent, andthus
to market-to-book ratios, although the latter correlation
may be spurious.
The impact of any such relationship on the model may
be minor. One implication is that use of the simpleCAPM
is not strictly appropriate, since bank stocks have signifi-
cant aspects of contingent claims under these conditions.
However, as discussed above,theestimation results are not
very sensitive to the choice of required rates of return. A
22. This comment refers to the explicit pricing structure. Itis possible
that other elements of the regulatory process associated with deposit
insurance broughtthetrue cost ofthe insurance morecloselyinline with
its value.
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second implication is that market-to-book ratios will tend
to be higher for low capital banks than they would have
been absent imperfectly priced deposit insurance. But
measured rates of return on equity also will be higher, as
the benefits of the deposit insurance subsidy flowthrough
tothe banks' income.Therelationship betweenreturns and
theM/E ratio, which is the foundation of the model, may
be little affected. Put differently, the model specifies a
relationship between expected future cash flows and the
market value of equity. If deposit insurance affects ex-
pected cash flows, it affects market value,and thateffect is
captured within the model; if deposit insurance does not




This paper presents a model of the market valueof firmsin
which profits are persistent. Zero profit equilibrium is
reestablished gradually when positive or negative spreads
generate a return on equity different from the required
return. The resulting nonlinear model can be estimated
using stock market data, in which case the parameter
estimates reflect market beliefs about the degree of profit
persistence. The model is applied to the banking industry,
with a sample of large U.S. banks. Results generally
indicate that the market views the rate of competitive
adjustment as positive. Despite the protection extended to
the banking industry by government regulatory policies,
there appear to be forces operating to eliminate nonzero
profits, and any nonzero spreads can be expected to be
temporary rather than permanent; however, the pace of
adjustment is slow. When the sample is split into two
groups-banks with economic returns below the cost of
equity and banks earning at least their cost of equity-the
estimated speed of adjustment for negative spreads gener-
ally exceeds that for positive spreads, although not always
significantly so.
The model used is a relatively simple discounted cash
flow model of the value of shares. The features that
23. The correlation between capital ratios and market-to-book ratios
creates a degree of ambiguity, in that the data cannot be used reliably to
test the hypothesis that profitablebanks have sloweradjustment speeds
than unprofitable banks against an alternative hypothesis that high-
capital banks have slower adjustment speeds than low-capital banks.
However, it is not clear why adjustment speeds should depend on
capital. It is occasionally claimed that regulators pressure low-capital
banks to increase profits to rebuild capital; this story rests on question-
able assumptions about bank behavior, since it is in banks' interest to
raise profits as rapidly as possible, regardless of any pressure from
regulators.16 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
distinguish it from other such models are (i) that account-
ing ROE reflects, albeit imperfectly, the economic rate of
returnR (and therefore the rate of economic profits for any
given required return k), and (ii) that competitive forces
tend to push economic profits toward zero over time.
No effort is made to identify the sources of the profit
persistence evident in the banking data. A high degree
ofprofit persistence might simplyfollowfromthe nature of
the banking business; perhaps information costs are excep-
tionally high, or innovations are difficult to imitate suc-
cessfully. On the other hand, persistence could result from
impediments to competition created intentionally by the
banksor unintentionallybygovernmentpolicies. In princi-
ple, one could identify the markets in which sample banks
operate, and test whether profit persistence is systemati-
cally related to market structure. However, a valid test
would be difficult or impossible with availabledata. Banks
that are large enough to havepublicly traded equity gener-
ally operate in many different banking markets, each with
different structural and behavioral features. Profit per-
sistence almost certainly varies across geographically sep-
aratemarkets, but there is no realistic wayto attribute total
bank profitability to specific local markets.
Nevertheless, the results may have implications for the
way competitive performance is evaluated. In a world of
uncertainty, imperfect information, and adjustment costs,
profits may turnpositive temporarily and then adjust back
to zero over time; the existence of nonzero profits at a
single point in time, or even over several periods, is not
a practical signal of lack of competition. Ultimately, dy-
namic competitive performance may be more important
than static performance. Thus it may be more useful to
gauge the degree to which a market is competitive byhow
rapidly any excess profits disappear. Adjustment speeds
could be calculated using the method described in this
paper, especially when theresults of time-series estimation
may be untrustworthy. The method used here distinguishes
between economic returns and accounting returns, and
filters out transitory elements of the economic returns.
Several possible enhancements to the model seem desir-
able. One modification would allow forthe possibility that
profit rates might converge to some nonzero long-run
value, that is, that R might converge to somevalueR* =1= k.
Mueller (1986) finds substantial differences across indus-
tries in the long-run profit rate to which individual firms
converge (although he alsoreports evidencethat in thevery
long run these differences tend to disappear). Lambson
(1992) provides theoretical justification for Mueller's em-
piricalobservation, arguing that long-runeconomic profits
can be nonzero. Another potential modification would
allow the adjustment speed to be a function of the absolute
spread between R and k. Larger positive spreads may
be more likely to stimulate a response for two reasons:
(i) large excess profits are more obvious, and (ii) greater
potential rewardsmight compensate would-be entrants for
the uncertainty they face, or for any fixed costs of entry.
Similar comments apply to negative spreads, with the
affected firm facing a large potential payoff from rapid
adjustment. Finally,itmaybe useful to investigate whether
other obvious groupings-related to firm size or other
characteristics-e-affect the degree of profit persistence.
The model presented above permits the growth rate to
vary·across banks, but assumes that the market expects
growth to be constant for any individual bank; this as-
sumption is made for the sake of tractability, not realism.
An enrichment of the model would allow g to depend on
the size of any positive spread. In the model, the value of
equity increases with g, provided R>k. Itis possible that
firms with a spread-creating competitive advantage face a
strategic choice: Raise profit margins to increase the
spread between Rand k, or hold prices down to grab
market share from competitors and raise g. Competitive
adjustment then might occur in both the profit dimension
and the growth dimension.
The adjustment speeds estimated here are lower than
those found in studies of nonbank firms. However, the
methods used in previous studies are different, making
direct comparisons difficult. Application of the model
developed in this paper to other industries is an obvious
avenue for future research. The degree of asymmetry in
bank profit persistence could be compared with similar
estimates for other industries; forexample, do bank profits
adjust more slowly in both directions?
As a final note, this model specifies a theoretically
defensible relationship between market data and the ac-
counting data used to construct ROE, g, and E. The
relationshipseemstofitreasonablywell, andmayprovidea
frameworkforusing accounting figurestogenerate pseudo-
market-value numbers. Suchanimputationofmarketvalue
would be helpful in analyzing the condition of banking
firms more generally, particularly those without publicly
traded equity.REFERENCES
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